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It has long been recognized that the existence of separate taxes on
corporate income and personal income may reduce the efficiency of the
allocation of capital. This recognition has given rise to proposals to
integrate the two taxes in a variety of ways. This chapter presents esti-
mates of static and dynamic general equilibrium resource allocation
effects for four integration plans for the United States. Our results
indicate that total integration of personal and corporate taxes would yield
an annual static efficiency gain of around $4 billion to $8 billion, in 1973
dollars. Partial integration plans yield less of a gain. Our analysis indi-
cates that full integration may yield dynamic gains whose present value is
at least $300 billion, and could be as large as $695 billion. This is about 1.4
percent of the discounted present value of consumption and leisure in the
U.S. economy, after correction for population growth. The plans differ in
their distributional effects. Both the distribution and efficiency results
depend on the replacement taxes used to preserve government revenues.
8.1 The Taxation of Corporate Income
A corporate tax that operates separately from the personal income tax
is widely acknowledged to lead to a number of problems associated with
the "double" taxation of corporate income (see McLure 1979). Divi-
dends are paid out of corporate profits net of corporate taxes. Dividends
are further taxed under the personal income tax. Retained earnings are
also taxed twice, to the extent they are capitalized in higher share values.
This chapter is a revised version of an article by Don Fullerton, A. Thomas King, John B.
Shoven, and John Whalley, "Corporate tax integration in the United States: A general
equilibrium approach," American Economic Review 71 (September 1981): 677-91. Repro-
duced by permission.
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(However, the capital gains resulting from retained earnings are not fully
taxed by the personal income tax, and they are taxed on a deferred basis.)
One problem with this double taxation is that it may reduce overall
rates of return and affect capital accumulation adversely. A second
problem is that the deferral advantage given to retained earnings impairs
the efficiency of capital markets. This is sometimes referred to as the
"lock-in" effect. Firms can invest retained earnings in projects with a
below-market yield, and their shareholders can still earn a higher net-of-
tax return than if the funds were distributed as dividends and invested
elsewhere.
A third problem is that there is a bias toward debt finance, since only
equity returns are subject to corporate taxes. This bias may distort
corporate financial policies. A fourth distortion may exist to the extent
that firms can choose whether or not to incorporate, as in Ebrill and
Hartman (1982).
A final problem is that the corporate tax introduces higher effective tax
rates in some industries than others, due to special provisions in the
corporate tax law and to the varying degrees to which industries are
incorporated. These tax rate differentials further disrupt an efficient
allocation of capital. Refer back to figure 2.1, in which a fixed amount of
capital is allocated between two sectors such that the net-of-tax rate of
return is equalized. Here we can interpret sector X as the corporate
sector and sector Y as the noncorporate sector. Without any partial
capital taxes, the equalized rate of return (on value of marginal product)
is 7 and the capital allocation is A^and Ky.Ifa. tax is imposed on capital in
sector X, the new allocation is given by K\ and Ky with the equalized net
rate of return being rn. The tax is the difference between rg and rn in sector
X. The value of the foregone output in sector X is given by the area
ABKxKl, whereas the value of the increasing output in sector Y is
EFK^K®. The difference is the area of the two triangles in area ABCD.
This is the efficiency cost or deadweight loss of the differential tax.
As we noted in section 3.2 when we described our modeling of the
corporation tax, economists disagree on the importance and even the
direction of these biases. Stiglitz (1973), for example, points out that a
corporate tax on properly measured income could have a neutral effect
on incentives if the marginal investment is entirely financed by debt. For
equity finance, Feldstein and Slemrod (1980) point out that the corporate
tax system can shelter income for a high-bracket stockholder. Especially
when personal tax brackets extended up to 70 percent, the owners of
corporations could have their total taxes reduced by paying only the
corporate rate on retained earnings. Even the extra tax on dividends may
not distort investments at the margin, if the market values of shares
already reflect the fact that these taxes must be paid eventually when155 Corporate and Personal Income Taxes
profits are distributed. For elaboration of this argument, see Auerbach
(1979b), Bradford (1981), and King (1977). Finally, we note here that the
corporate tax may be greatly reduced or eliminated by some depreciation
allowances and by interest deductions on the part of the marginal invest-
ment financed by debt.
In our model, personal taxes combine with corporate taxes to raise
effective tax rates in industries that are highly incorporated, but observed
corporate taxes are still reduced by the extent to which each industry
makes use of credits, deductions, and allowances. Also, we note that our
model considers intertemporal and intersectoral distortions in the alloca-
tion of real capital, but does not include endogenous financial decisions
or distortions in the choices among debt, retained earnings, or dividend
policy.
Integration plans seek to remove or mitigate the adverse effects of the
two separate tax systems by linking the personal income tax liabilities of
stockholders to the corporate tax liabilities of the firms. In this chapter we
consider four corporate tax integration alternatives. The plans differ in
the extent to which they remove the undesirable features of the present
corporate income tax.
For three of the four plans, we consider two "subplans." In one case
the second distinction has to do with whether we index capital gains for
inflation. In the other cases the subplans differ from each other according
to the way in which we model corporate dividend/retention policies.
Finally, we consider the case in which capital tax rates are made equal for
all industries. This last case is not being offered as a realistic policy
proposal. Rather, we consider it as a basis for comparison.
Thus, while we have four main types of plans for integration of the
corporate and personal income taxes, we will present results for seven
integration plans and one plan for complete capital tax rate equalization.
We will now describe each of the integration plans in turn.
Plan 1: Total Integration. Under this alternative, the corporate income
tax is eliminated, and the personal income tax is modified to tax total
shareholder earnings, rather than just dividends. When capital gains are
realized, the tax basis is set at the original purchase price plus the retained
earnings accumulated during the holding period. This feature avoids a
double tax on retained earnings capitalized in higher stock prices.
However, if the basis is not reset for inflation, capital gains taxes will be
assessed on purely nominal appreciation. This amounts to a capital
wealth levy. We evaluate this total integration plan with and without
inflation indexation of capital gains.
These total integration plans are the most comprehensive we consider.
They contain modifications to the income tax which, if they had been
made originally, would have dispensed with the need for a separate156 Chapter Eight
corporate tax. Industrial distortions through the corporate tax are re-
moved, as is the corporate tax distortion of intertemporal consumption
choice.
Plan 2: Dividend Deduction from Corporate Income Tax Base. This
approach simply removes the "double" taxation of dividends by making
them deductible from taxable corporate income. Capital gains taxation of
individuals is unaltered, and the corporate income tax is effectively
converted into a tax on retained earnings. Unless differences in retention
policies by industry were to disappear, the corporate tax would continue
to result in some discrimination among industries. Plan 2 would result in
an incentive to pay out more dividends. In section 8.3, we will discuss the
dividend/retention behavior of corporations. We will also present a
model alternative that will test the sensitivity of our results to changes in
corporate financial policies.
Plan 3: Dividend Deduction from Personal Income Tax Base. An
alternative way of removing the "double" taxation of dividends is to
allow a dividend deduction from the personal income tax rather than
from the corporate income tax. Capital gains taxation is again unaltered.
As with plan 2, differences in retention policies by industry will perpetu-
ate the industrial discrimination caused by the corporate tax. However, it
will also once again be true that corporations will have an incentive to
pay out more dividends. As mentioned earlier, we will discuss this in
section 8.3.
Plan 4: Dividend Gross-Up. This was the plan most actively discussed
in the U.S. tax reform debate during 1977. It only seeks a partial reduc-
tion of the double taxation of dividends. The taxable incomes of indi-
vidual shareholders are "grossed up" by some proportion of the corpo-
rate income taxes paid by corporations. Then the shareholders receive a
corresponding tax credit. Individuals whose personal tax rates are lower
than the corporate tax rate will effectively receive a rebate. Individuals
with higher personal tax rates will end up paying additional taxes at the
personal level. Because of the partial nature of the credit, none of the
distortions listed above will be removed entirely.
8.2 Representing the Tax Integration Plans
in Model Equivalent Form
Each of the four tax integration plans described in section 8.1 must be
represented in model equivalent form for the purpose of analyzing its
general equilibrium effects. Each plan implies a different set of values for
the capital tax rates and for^, the proportion of capital income from
industry i which is taxable at the personal level (see chapter 3).157 Corporate and Personal Income Taxes
Plan 1: Total Integration. Under this plan, corporate taxes are elimi-
nated from the numerator of the new capital tax rate calculation. The
personal income tax is changed to tax all earnings rather than just
dividends. This means thatgR£, the fraction of retained earnings taxed at
the personal level, is set to one. We calculate new^ parameters using this
new gRE, but with the same capital income weights as before. These
changes imply new personal factor taxes and thus new capital tax rates by
industry.
Plan 2: Dividend Deduction from Corporate Income Tax Base. This
plan's corporate income tax base is the undistributed profits of corpora-
tions. It is represented in model equivalent terms for each industry by
removing a portion of the corporate tax paid from the 1973 capital
taxation figures and recalculating the capital tax rate. The portion of
corporate tax removed is given by the ratio of dividends to net-of-tax
corporate profits by industry (U.S. Dept. of Commerce, BEA 1976b).
(We thus assume no change in corporate financial policy.) The f and the
personal income tax functions do not change.
Plan 3: Dividend Deduction from Personal Income Tax Base. This plan
removes dividends from the income tax system. In model equivalent
terms it is specified by considering the effect of dividend deductibility on
the income tax functions of households. We set gD, the proportion of
dividends taxable by the personal income tax, to zero, and all fi are
recalculated. Other adjustments are analogous to those made for plan 1.
Plan 4: Dividend Gross-Up. This scheme gives stockholders an income
tax credit of 15 percent of the corporate taxes paid by the firms in which
they own an interest. It is most satisfactorily modeled as a reduction in the
corporate taxes of each industry by the amount of the credit. This amount
is then treated as an increase in dividends in the calculation of new f
values. The new effective tax rates include 85 percent of corporate
income taxes and the new personal factor taxes. The higher dividends
relative to retained earnings result in higher f and / values, so that
consumers experience an increase in taxable capital income.
8.3 Corporate Financial Policies
Our model does not consider corporate financial policies directly,
although we have made some attempts to examine the sensitivity of our
findings to alternative assumptions about these policies.
In recent years a number of authors (Stiglitz, 1973, 1976; King, 1974)
have viewed the corporate tax as a differential tax on the various financial
instruments that are available for transferring capital income from firms
to individuals. According to this view, the capital income of corporations158 Chapter Eight
can be "paid" to the owners of capital by interest payments, dividends, or
retentions (which are assumed to be converted into capital gains). Each
of these instruments has tax and nontax advantages and disadvantages
that govern its relative use by industry. The firm that uses debt finance
can deduct interest from its corporate tax base. This tax advantage is
counteracted by the disadvantage that a heavily debt-financed company
has a higher probability of bankruptcy and/or takeover. Equity financing
cannot avoid corporate taxation. However, equity financing may result in
a large reduction in personal taxes if earnings are retained. Dividends
may be paid for a variety of reasons, even though they do not have any tax
advantage. For a recent study of the reasons for dividends, see Feldstein
and Green (1983).
For the purposes of this chapter, the important point is that when the
tax laws change, firms can be expected to modify their financial policies.
For example, if plan 2 (dividend deduction from the corporate tax)
encourages firms to pay out all earnings in dividends, then plan 1 (total
integration) and plan 2 are identical in their effects.
We do not have good estimates of the elasticities of financial policies
with respect to changes in the tax law. Therefore, we model various
extreme behavioral reactions and calculate the effects of the integration
plans, given these extreme assumptions. The two assumptions we will use
are, first, that corporate policies do not change, and second, that all
corporate income is paid in dividends. We cannot claim that we have a
"true" general equilibrium treatment of corporate financial policies. This
is because we adjust the dividend/retention ratio to estimate model
equivalent tax rates before we make our general equilibrium calculations.
Endogenous financial behavior in general equilibrium models has been
explored by a number of authors in recent years (see, for example,
Slemrod 1983, Feltenstein 1984, and Galper and Toder 1982).
8.4 The Lock-in Effect
The deferral advantage under the existing personal and corporate tax
structure gives a tax preference to retention by existing firms. This is the
lock-in effect. New firms entering financial markets must borrow at higher
interest rates than the required rate of return on retentions of existing
firms. Thus, if existing firms are more slowly growing and less efficient,
the proper allocation of resources to new firms may not take place.
Our general equilibrium model employs constant returns to scale tech-
nology. We do not incorporate an explicit theory of individual firm
behavior, and a reallocation of capital among firms within an industry
does not affect the industry production function. Therefore, we are
unable to model the efficiency aspects of the lock-in effect.
Our analysis of integration of the corporate and personal taxes will159 Corporate and Personal Income Taxes
consider interindustry and intertemporal distortions. Interindustry dis-
tortions enter through differences in rates of tax on capital income by
industry. Intertemporal distortions enter through the taxation of saving
generally.
8.5 Results
In table 8.1 we present the static efficiency effects of the integration
plans. Table 8.2 contains the static distributional effects. In table 8.3 we
present our calculations of dynamic effects.
1
To obtain the static measures of efficiency changes displayed in table
8.1, we first calculate the changes in national income plus leisure, valued
at prices before the policy change and after the policy change. We use
these Passche and Laspeyres quantity indexes (rather than compensating
or equivalent variations) because the consumers may assess the utility
contribution of saving inaccurately, due to their myopic expectations.
Instead of showing both the Laspeyres and Passche indexes, we merely
report the geometric mean of the two.
The main effect of corporate tax integration is that the capital stock is
allocated more efficiently among the industrial sectors. To get some idea
of the magnitude of these changes, let us focus on eight industries. Four
of these (agriculture, petroleum refining, real estate, and government
enterprises) have low rates of capital tax under the current law. The other
four (chemicals and rubber, metals and machinery, transportation equip-
ment, and motor vehicles) have high capital taxes. The differences are
due largely to differences in the degree of incorporation in these indus-
tries.
When the corporation income tax is removed, capital in the industries
that were previously more heavily taxed becomes a better buy than it was
before. Table 8.4 shows how capital gets reallocated among industries.
Seven industries end up using less capital in the first equilibrium under
corporate tax integration than they had used in the base case. These are
agriculture, mining, crude petroleum and gas, petroleum refining, real
estate, services, and government enterprises. Some 6.5 percent of the
total capital stock is reallocated in the first period under integration from
these seven industries to the other twelve industries.
Table 8.4 shows that the outputs of industries that were previously
treated more favorably have increases in price as a result of the tax
1. The figures in tables 8.1 and 8.3 are presented in billions of 1973 dollars. It may be
useful to give some idea of how large a 1973 dollar was. The Commerce Department's GNP
deflator stood at 105.8 in 1973 (with the 1972 value set to 100.0). By 1982 the GNP deflator
had risen to 213. Thus, if the structure of the economy were unchanged in the intervening
seven years, the welfare gain figures in tables 8.1 and 8.3 would have to be increased by
about 100 percent in order to bring them up to 1982 levels. However, we must urge caution
in making this kind of extrapolation.160 Chapter Eight
Table 8.1 Static Welfare Effects: Change in Annual Real Expanded National
Income (in billions of 1973 dollars)
Plan
Plan 1: Full integration
with indexing
Plan 1: Full integration
without indexing
Plan 2: Dividend deduction
from corporate income tax"
Plan 2: Dividend deduction




Plan 3: Dividend deduction
from personal income tax
3
Plan 3: Dividend deduction




Plan 4: Dividend gross-up









































Notes: Real expanded national income incorporates the change in the valuation of leisure
through induced variations in labor supply. The numbers reported are the geometric means
of Paasche and Laspeyres index numbers, for each tax replacement, as described in the text.
"The standard simulations for dividend deduction plans 2 and 3 assume that corporate
financial policies do not change. In particular, the new ^parameters are calculated with the
old levels of dividends and retained earnings as weights for gD and gRE. However these
dividend deduction plans might encourage greater distribution of corporate profits. The
extreme behavior assumption uses the sum of dividends and retained earnings as the weight
on gD, with no weight on gRE.
This result is for complete equalization of capital tax rates by industry. The property tax,
corporate franchise tax, corporate income tax, and personal factor tax are included in this
equalization. This result is presented for comparison purposes.
change. It is not surprising that these price changes lead to changes in the
prices of consumer goods. Two consumer goods have large increases in
their relative prices. These are housing and gasoline and other fuels.
Among the consumer goods with the largest decreases in relative prices
are nondurable, nonfood household items, motor vehicles, appliances,
and clothing and jewelry.
Because the total capital stock has not changed in just the first period of
the revised-case simulation, the social marginal product or gross return to
capital changes only slightly. However, overall taxes are reduced as a
result of corporate tax integration, so the net return to capital (PK) rises










E •? .i .>;





•8 § - | | 2 1 g
•S -a 6 & o 3 « 3 J I 1 I I I




00 r- •— Ui
= 25^^
•a 3 f





oon H oo ooao
vo m CT\ oo o o r-
•* o o\ oo \o oo as
N n rn O o o O
s
O O\ O\ O ON O ^O






























































Table 8.3 Dynamic Welfare Effects: Present Value of Equivalent Variations
Over Time (in
Plan
Plan 1: Full integration
with indexing
Plan 1: Full integration
without indexing




Plan 2: Dividend deduction
from corporate income tax,










with extreme behavior assumption
3 (0.989)




Plan 3: Dividend deduction




with extreme behavior assumption
2 (0.633)
Plan 4: Dividend gross-up










































Notes: We consider eleven equilibria, five-years apart, in order to project annual consump-
tion values over the fifty intervening years. For consumption beyond year fifty, we have an
appropriate treatment of the terminal conditions. The dynamic equivalent variations are
analogs of static concepts applied to the consumption sequence over time, assuming the
first-period discount factor is unchanged.
The numbers in parentheses represent the gain as a percentage of the present discounted
value of welfare (consumption plus leisure) in the base sequence. The value is $49 trillion for
all comparisons, and only accounts for a population the size of that in 1973.
"See footnote a, table 8.1.
bSee footnote b, table 8.1.
efficiently. In the base sequence of equilibria, all prices are equal to unity
in all periods by our units convention and the assumption that the
benchmark equilibrium lies on a steady-state growth path. In the first
equilibrium period under full corporate tax integration, the relative price
of capital rises to 1.208 (we normalize by setting the price of labor equal
to 1.0). However, the price of capital does not stay so high in later periods
because more saving occurs under integration than in the base case. In
the first equilibrium period, the higher net rate of return to capital leads
to a 14.5 percent increase in saving. By the second equilibrium period,
which occurs five years after the first period, the relative price of capitalI
fa
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drops to 1.188. In the third period it reaches 1.171, in the fourth 1.151,
and so on. By the tenth equilibrium period, the price of capital services
stands at 1.111, and it drops to 1.107 by the eleventh and final period.
Notice that the decreases in the relative price of capital become smaller
over time as the economy approaches a new steady-state growth path
asymptotically.
The distributional effects reported in table 8.2 depend upon both the
sources side and the uses side of each consumer's budget. As we have
indicated, the price of capital rises in the simulated equilibrium. It turns
out that low-income consumers tend to spend a large proportion of their
income on consumer goods that are produced by lightly taxed, capital-
intensive industries such as agriculture and real estate. For example, the
poorest group spends 19.7 percent of its net money income on food and
21.8 percent on housing, while the richest group spends 14.6 percent on
food and 12.5 percent on housing. Therefore, the uses side of the con-
sumer's budget has some regressive effects on the income distribution,
when corporate tax integration occurs.
On the sources side, the distributional impact of any policy change is
driven by the fact that the capital/labor ratio of income is bowl-shaped
across our twelve consumer groups. That is, the very-low-income groups
and the highest-income group have factor endowments that are more
heavily weighted by capital. The capital /labor ratios for the incomes of
the twelve consumer groups are shown in table 8.5. With corporate tax
integration, the various consumers have slightly higher capital/labor
ratios, but the overall picture is preserved almost precisely. The higher
price of capital leads to U-shaped gains by consumer groups when we
Table 8.5 Ratio of Capital Income to Labor Income
for Twelve Income Classes
Capital Income/
Income Class Labor Income
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simulate corporate tax integration (see the columns under plan 1 in table
8.2).
The U-shaped character of the gains from corporate tax integration is
interesting, but it may be more important to bear in mind that all groups
gain. Thus, we have a Pareto improvement. However, although the
simulated equilibrium is a Pareto improvement over the benchmark 1973
equilibrium, we have said nothing about the possible paths between the
two. Short-run losses and transition costs should be considered before
enacting such a change. Our model is essentially comparative static and
does not measure these disequilibria or temporary influences.
We now report further results for each of the integration plans.
Plan 1: Total Integration. This plan only removes part of the industrial
discrimination in the taxation of capital income, because property taxes
remain as differential capital taxes by industry. Property taxes are partic-
ularly important in the agriculture and real estate industries.
Interindustry discrimination is reduced enough to provide a $4 billion
annual static welfare gain in each year (table 8.1, in 1973 dollars) for the
cases with either multiplicative or additive scaling and inflation indexa-
tion of capital gains taxes. Without this correction for inflation, the
efficiency gains are slightly less. Table 8.3 shows that dynamic gains are
sensitive to the replacement yield-preserving tax considered. With addi-
tive scaling a gain of $418 billion occurs, and with multiplicative scaling a
gain of $311 billion occurs. To give the reader a better feel for the relative
magnitude of these numbers, we should mention that the discounted
present value of the future income stream for the population living in
1973 is about $49 trillion under the present tax system. (This figure is also
in 1973 dollars.) The sensitivity of these dynamic results to the replace-
ment tax can be explained by the positive correlation between income
and the proportion of income saved. Since multiplicative scaling collects
more tax revenue from high-income groups, it creates a greater distortion
in their intertemporal choices. Less saving occurs, and the new balanced
growth path has a lower capital/labor ratio than it would have had with
other kinds of replacement.
2
Before going on, let us give a somewhat fuller indication of the relative
magnitude of these gains. As shown in table 8.3, the $311 billion gain
resulting from integration with multiplicative scaling is equal to about
2. The reader may wonder exactly how much effect the multiplicative or additive scaling
schemes have on marginal income tax rates. The marginal rates in the base case can be found
in table 5.8. They range from .01 for the poorest consumer to .41 for the one with the highest
income. Under additive replacement, in the first period, all marginal rates are increased by
3.98 percentage points. Thus, the new rate schedule ranges from 5 percent to 45 percent. By
the eleventh period, the additive tax scalar is slightly lower, at 2.90 percentage points.
Under multiplicative replacement, in the first period, all marginal rates are multiplied by the
same factor of 1.163. Under this scheme, the marginal rates on the lowest groups hardly
increase, whereas the marginal rate on the top income class rises to over 47 percent.166 Chapter Eight
0.62 percent of the present value of expanded national income (including
the value of leisure) after correction for population growth. (See chapter
7 for the details of our dynamic welfare analysis.) It is also equal to about
0.91 percent of the present value of population-corrected national in-
come. These figures may not be striking. However, when we see that the
gain is 16.5 percent of the present value of the revenue that the corporate
income tax would collect, is appears that the gains are quite substantial.
We do not need to consider changes in financial policies under this
plan. With full integration, all forms of corporate capital income are
taxed identically. The tax does not depend on whether corporate capital
income is paid in interest, paid in dividends, or retained. Therefore, a
change in either the debt/equity or dividend/retention ratio will not alter
the new effective tax rates or the new fi for the revised equilibrium
calculation. The resulting solution would be the same even if the ratios
changed.
Plan 2: Dividend Deduction from Corporate Income Tax Base. Here
dividends are treated like interest for tax purposes, and we first assume
that corporations continue to retain the same portion of income. The
reduction of the corporate income tax base causes some leveling of
capital tax rates and results in a small increase in yearly welfare. Dynamic
gains under multiplicative scaling of tax rates are $58 billion. Under
lump-sum replacement, dynamic gains are $260 billion. The reduced
spread of dynamic results is due to the smaller revenue loss associated
with plan 2. When the amount of revenue to be replaced is small, the
additive or multiplicative replacement schemes do not add as much
distortion of intertemporal choice.
Under our "standard" treatment of plan 2, the dividend /retention
ratio is assumed constant even though an incentive exists to replace
retained earnings with dividends, which are no longer taxed. For this
reason we also consider the extreme case where all corporate earnings are
distributed. The corporate income tax would thus be effectively elimi-
nated, and fi calculations would proceed on the assumption that all
corporate earnings are multiplied by the higher .96 for gD, the proportion
of dividends that is taxable at the personal level. The static gain for such a
tax replacement is around $8 billion per year under lump-sum replace-
ment, $4 billion under additive or multiplicative scaling, and $5 billion
under a sales tax replacement. The dynamic gains are comparable to the
gains under full integration. These welfare gains are substantially above
the gains calculated using the assumption of fixed dividend/retention
policies. This is because corporate decision makers have, in effect, re-
duced the distortion of the corporate income tax with its differing effec-
tive capital tax rates. The Plan 2 extreme-behavior case leads to U-shaped
gains among consumers, similar to those for the case in which corporate
financial policies are assumed to remain unchanged.167 Corporate and Personal Income Taxes
Plan 3: Dividend Deduction from Personal Income Tax Base. The
reduced tax on dividends again implies lower tax rates on heavily incor-
porated industries and a leveling of all rates in general. This occurs
through the lower fi for dividend-paying industries. Static welfare gains
are about $3 billion per year. With multiplicative scaling, dynamic gains
are $208 billion. Under lump-sum replacement the gains here are about
$264 billion, which is about the same as under plan 2. The multiplicative
results reflect the importance of the deduction from the upwardly scaled
income tax. As might be expected, table 8.2 shows that plan 3 has less
progressive effects than the second plan, since dividend income is all
taxed at the corporate rate instead of at progressive personal tax rates.
Under extreme financial policy behavior, where firms no longer retain
earnings, both the static and dynamic gains are somewhat larger. The
corporate tax remains the same, but the new f include all corporate
earnings as dividends with a gD of zero. Less corporate income is subject
to the personal income tax. The difference between results with and
without the extreme-behavior assumption is less than for plan 2, because
the personal income tax deduction does less to eliminate interindustry
discrimination than does the corporate income tax deduction for div-
idends. The distributional effects for the extreme-behavior case of plan 3
are generally regressive, although the middle groups all have similar
relative improvements. This pattern is similar to the pattern for the case
in which we assume no change in financial policies.
Plan 4: Dividend Gross-Up. All plans that decrease the corporate
income tax only on dividends can be termed partial integration plans. The
fourth plan might be called a partial partial plan, because it reduces only
part of the tax on dividends. The static welfare gain is $2.5 billion per year
when personal tax rates are scaled upward in order to maintain real
government expenditure. Dynamic gains under multiplicative scaling are
$129 billion, under additive scaling are $142 billion, and under VAT
replacement are $161 billion. Here, again, the spread between the dy-
namic welfare gains is less than that of full integration because this plan
involves smaller revenue loss than full integration. Multiplicative scaling
makes up most revenue from high-income, high-saving consumers, and it
thus reduces future capital stocks and incomes. The dynamic lump-sum
and additive cases show that the dividend gross-up does substantially less
to improve the interindustry resource allocation than other plans.
As a basis for comparison we will now report the effects of complete
equalization of capital tax rates by industry. We report these results even
though we realize that complete equalization of capital tax rates is not a
realistic policy proposal. In this case we eliminate all tax discrimination
on capital use among industries, use a single tax rate for all industries, and
tax equally all capital income at the personal income tax level. Capital tax
rates are set to a common rate, providing government with enough168 Chapter Eight
revenue to maintain its real purchases. The fi parameters are all reset to
/—the overall fraction of capital income that is effectively fully taxed by
the personal income tax system. The resulting efficiency gains are larger
than those of the four integration plans. These gains represent the max-
imum possible increase in expanded national income from the elimina-
tion of interindustry capital tax distortions.
Results in table 8.1 indicate that the efficiency gain from equalizing
capital taxes by industry is about $10.9 billion per year in 1973 dollars.
Table 8.2 shows that the gain turns out to be distributed in such a way that
every group experiences an increase in real income. Thus, this change
would be a Pareto improvement. Dynamic gains in this case (table 8.3)
are $545 billion, which is about 1.1 percent of the discounted present
value of the future U.S. income stream after correction for population
growth. It is also about 14.7 percent of the discounted present value of the
revenues from all taxes on capital (including corporate taxes and property
taxes).
The capital tax equalization removes all interindustry distortions, but it
leaves intertemporal distortions because the common capital tax rate is
scaled to preserve total tax revenue. Full integration with lump-sum
replacement, described above, has larger efficiency gains in table 8.3,
because it removes some interindustry distortions and some intertempo-
ral distortions.
The last results we will report deal with inflation and inflation indexing.
As we explained in chapter 3, our model treats nominal capital gains and
real capital gains separately. The effects of indexation of nominal capital
gains depend on the rate of inflation. We specify the rate of inflation as an
exogenous parameter, and we assume that the same rate of inflation
persists throughout each sequence of equilibrium calculations. Our stan-
dard case sets the inflation rate at 7 percent. In table 8.6 we present the
Table 8.6 Sensitivity of Dynamic Welfare Effects Due to Full Integration with
Indexing, to the Assumed Rate of Inflation (in billions of 1973
dollars)
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Table 8.7 Sensitivity of Dynamic Welfare Effects Due to Indexing of Nominal
Capital Gains, to the Assumed Rate of Inflation (in billions of 1973
dollars)
Type of Scaling to Preserve Equal Yield
Lump-Sum Multiplicative Additive VAT
2 percent inflation 66.2 29.6 38.0 51.4
(0.135) (0.060) (0.078) (0.105)
7 percent inflation 254.0 123.0 158.4 205.8
(0.509) (0.247) (0.318) (0.413)
12 percent inflation 474.5 245.8 314.9 397.5
(0.931) (0.482) (0.618) (0.780)
Note: Numbers in parentheses represent the gain as a percentage of the present value of
welfare in the base sequence.
dynamic welfare gains from full integration with indexing (plan 1), for
different levels of the inflation rate. It should not be surprising that the
gains are greater when the inflation rate is greater, since a higher inflation
rate leads to greater distortionary taxation, which can be removed if we
index.
In table 8.7 we show that the economy can derive substantial welfare
gains from merely indexing nominal capital gains, without integrating the
corporate and personal income taxes. Once again, the gains depend on
the method of equal yield replacement and on the rate of inflation.
8.6 Conclusion
In this chapter we have analyzed four plans for corporate and personal
income tax integration in the United States.
Total integration of the personal and corporate income taxes is shown
to yield static efficiency gains of about $4 billion to $8 billion per year, in
1973 dollars. The present value of the dynamic gains range from $311
billion to $695 billion, depending on the yield-preserving tax. Without
indexing, these gains ranged from $288 billion to $474 billion. The
dynamic gains results from the other plans are generally lower, although
they exceeded $100 billion in every case.
The static distributional effects vary among plans. Full integration with
multiplicative scaling leads to a progressive change in the distribution of
real income over most of the income range. In addition, every class is
better off. Dividend deductibility from the personal income tax has a
beneficial effect that is more advantageous to high-income groups. Div-
idend deductibility from the corporate income tax redistributes from
upper-middle-income groups to low-income groups and the highest-
income group. The dividend gross-up plan is roughly proportional, with170 Chapter Eight
slightly greater gains at the top and bottom of the income scale. We want
to emphasize the sensitivity of dynamic gains to the yield-preserving tax.
This suggests that the potential gains under integration from removal of
intertemporal distortions would be significantly reduced if marginal in-
come tax rates are raised, particularly if the higher-income groups, who
are also larger savers, face larger tax rate increases.
We have tried to emphasize that our analyses of dividend deductions
from either tax are not fully general equilibrium analyses. This is because
we cannot estimate the change in corporate financial policies. As a partial
remedy for this shortcoming we have analyzed the dividend deduction
plans under two assumptions about corporate dividend policies. The first
assumption is that these policies do not change. The second is that all
corporate income is paid out in dividends. The second assumption leads
to greater gains in both the static and dynamic cases and under all three
kinds of equal yield replacement. The gains are greater because complete
dividend payout implies greater equalization of tax rates on capital.
Finally, we have analyzed the effects of complete equalization of the
tax rates on capital for all industries. The resulting gains are the largest
that can result from the removal of interindustry distortions. Our results
suggest that the gains from such tax rate equalization would be substan-
tial. In the static case we found the gains to be almost $10.9 billion, in
1973 dollars. All consumer groups share in the gains. In the dynamic case,
the present value of the gains was in excess of $545 billion.
Among the most interesting of the results in this chapter are the
dynamic results, which suggest that there are significant potential gains
from corporate tax integration, provided that replacement taxes do not
excessively interfere with intertemporal consumption choice. A trade-off
appears to occur between achieving progressive or proportional income
gains through multiplicative scaling and maximizing the dynamic effi-
ciency gain. Larger intertemporal gains can be secured by keeping the
taxes on high-income groups low, because these are the groups that do
the most saving.